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The Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol is being included in
a growing number of connected objects such as fitness trackers
and headphones. As part of the service discovery mechanism of
BLE, devices announce themselves by broadcasting radio signals
called advertisement packets that can be collected with off-the-shelf
hardware and software. To avoid the risk of tracking based on those
messages, BLE features an address randomization mechanism that
substitutes the device address with random temporary pseudonyms,
called Private addresses.
In this paper, we analyze the privacy issues associated with the
advertising mechanism of BLE, leveraging a large dataset of adver-
tisement packets collected in the wild. First, we identified that some
implementations fail at following the BLE specifications on the
maximum lifetime and the uniform distribution of random identi-
fiers. Furthermore, we found that the payload of the advertisement
packet can hamper the randomization mechanism by exposing
counters and static identifiers. In particular, we discovered that
advertising data of Apple and Microsoft proximity protocols can
be used to defeat the address randomization scheme. Finally, we
discuss how some elements of advertising data can be leveraged
to identify the type of device, exposing the owner to inventory
attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a 2.4 GHz ISM radio communica-
tion standard developed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group
(SIG). Compared to Bluetooth, BLE provides a reduced power con-
sumption while maintaining a similar communication range that
makes it suitable for devices with low energy resources such as
fitness trackers, headphones, etc. According to the Bluetooth SIG,
more than 2 billion devices supporting BLE have been shipped in
2018 [25].
While wireless technologies such as Bluetooth/BLE or Wi-Fi
bring hands-on facilities, they also have the potential to expose
users to physical tracking because of the identifiers found within
the radio signals emitted by their devices [8, 10, 27]. To protect
users against this threat, the LE Privacy [24, Vol 3, Part C, sec.
10.7] feature defines the use of temporary link layer identifiers
that periodically change for a random value. However, it has been
shown [7, 8] that some information can still leak from BLE devices.
As other wireless technologies, BLE features a discovery mech-
anism called advertisement [24, Vol 3, Part C, sec. 11]. To enable
this mechanism, devices periodically broadcast advertisement pack-
ets that are populated with a variety of information announcing
their characteristics and available services. Those packets are trans-
mitted in clear, opening new possibilities for passively tracking
users in the physical world [11, 20].
In this paper, we present an analysis of the privacy provisions
provided by the LE Privacy feature as well as its limitations. Our
study is based on a dataset of real-world observations of BLE ad-
vertisement traffic containing about 8 million packets associated to
more than 53500 different device addresses collected over a period
of 5 months.
Our contributions are threefold:
• We analyze the deployment of the address randomization
mechanism in the wild. In particular, we found that the LE
Privacy feature is largely adopted and that most implemen-
tations follow the specifications. However, we also found
that a significant fraction of devices are not exhibiting those
properties, exposing their users to tracking;
• We show that the content of advertisement packets can un-
dermine the protections provided by the LE Privacy feature.
Indeed, we found that some devices include unique identi-
fiers and counters that are not reset upon an address change.
We also identified fields containing temporary identifiers,
but for which the renewal is not done at the same time as
the random address change;
• We identify that advertisement packets include data that
can reveal the manufacturer, the model and the type of the
device, exposing the user to inventory attacks and inference
of sensitive attributes. For instance, some medical devices
are broadcasting their types (hearing aid, glucometer, insulin
pen, etc.) trivially exposing a medical condition of the owner.
The paper is organized as follows. First, a BLE background is
provided in Section 2. Then, Section 3 defines our experimental
methodology. We present observations on our dataset in Section 4.
Section 5 gives a detailed inspection of the BLE device address
randomization mechanism and we show how it can be defeated in
Section 6. Section 7 shows the additional information leaked by the
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advertising data. Finally, we highlight the related work in Section 8
and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 BLE protocol
BLE has been introduced in 2010 as part of the Bluetooth Core
Specification version 4.0 [22, Vol 6]. In this protocol, 3 channels are
dedicated to the discovery mechanism called advertisement while
the 37 remaining channels are used for data exchanges between
two connected devices.
A BLE device can endorse twomain roles, Peripheral and Central,
following a client-server model. A Peripheral device periodically
broadcasts advertisement packets and, if connectable, accepts in-
coming connection requests from Central. A Central device listens
to advertisement packets and, when applicable, initiates a connec-
tion with a Peripheral. Note that, a BLE device cannot endorse both
roles at the same time.
At the physical layer [24, Vol 6, Part B, sec. 2.1], BLE packets
are split into 4 fields: the Preamble, the Access Address, the Protocol
Data Unit (PDU) and the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). In the
case of advertisement packets, the Access Address shall be set to
0x8e89bed6 [24, Vol 6, Part B, sec. 2.1.2]. The PDU itself is divided
into two sections: a 2-byte header and a variable size payload. The
header describes the type of the PDU and the class of the BLE device
address (Public or random). The payload part contains the device
address followed by the advertising data.
2.2 Device addressing
During communications, devices are identified by a Bluetooth de-
vice address (BD_ADDR), a 48-bit identifier found within the Ad-
vertising Address (AdvA) field of the advertising payload. As part of
the LE Privacy feature, BLE supports 3 types of random addresses
in addition to the globally unique MAC address (Public):
• Public device address: the address uniquely allocated to the
device by the manufacturer in accordance to the IEEE speci-
fications of MAC addresses [1, sec. 8.2];
• Random Static device address: a randomly generated device
address that can be renewed after each power cycle and that
shall not change during the use of the device;
• Random Non-resolvable device address: a randomly gener-
ated address that can be renewed at any time;
• Random Resolvable device address: an address composed of
a 22-bit random number prand and a 24-bit hash produced by
the hashing of prand with a 128-bit secret Identity Resolution
Key (IRK). This IRK is shared between two BLE devices at
the time of pairing and allows the Central device to resolve
the Peripheral address that would otherwise look random.
The Bluetooth Core Specification [24, Vol 3, Part C, App. A]
recommends to renew Random Non-resolvable and Random Re-
solvable addresses every 15 minutes.
In addition to this address classification, we define two other
categories based on the temporal persistence of the device address:
• Stable addresses: device addresses that are used by a device
indefinitely or for an extended period of time, i.e. Public and
Random Static addresses.
(Length -1) bytes1 byte 1 byte





Figure 1: Representation of the BLE advertising PDU’s
header and payload. The payload part contains the Adver-
tising Address (AdvA) field followed byAdvertising Data (AD)
structures. The Length field represents the length of the AD
structure (excluding itself); Type specifies the nature of the
following data and Data are the advertising data.
• Private addresses: device addresses that are supposed to
change frequently, i.e. Random Non-resolvable and Random
Resolvable addresses.
2.3 BLE advertisement
Advertisement is the name of the BLE discovery mechanism that
allows Central devices to discover Peripherals in range prior to set
up a connection. It is used to broadcast connectionless data such as
device characteristics and supported services, but also data coming
from services and custom applications. In addition to the frame
header, advertisement packets can contain up to 31 bytes of cleartext
data that can be collected and processed by any BLE device in
range. Moreover, Central devices can query a Peripheral by sending
a directed scan request that triggers back a scan response. The
content of a scan response follows the same format as advertisement
packets but will include different elements of information.
The advertising payload consists of the AdvA field (equal to the
BD_ADDR of the Peripheral) followed by a sequence of one or more
Advertising Data (AD) structures used to carry items of information.
An AD structure is composed of a 1-byte field indicating the length
of the AD structure (excluding itself), followed by a 1-byte field
specifying the type1 of the AD and finally, a sequence of up to 29
bytes of cleartext data (see Figure 1). A subset of common AD types
is presented in Table 2.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data collection protocol
This work is based on a dataset of advertisement packets and scan
responses that have been collected over 5months by the authors dur-
ing commute, work and leisure times. To collect the data, we used a
Raspberry Pi single-board computer equipped with a CSR v4.0 Blue-
tooth USB dongle. In order to collect advertisement packets on BLE
advertising channels, we developed a C software based on BlueZ
libraries, the official Linux Bluetooth stack. Furthermore, as adver-
tising data can be obtained from both advertisement packets and
1https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/assigned-numbers/generic-access-
profile
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scan responses (see Section 2.3), we designed our C software to col-
lect advertisement packets and automatically send scan requests to
obtain potential scan responses from discovered Peripherals.
3.2 Structure of the data
Our dataset contains a set of records, each record corresponding
to an advertising frame (advertisement packet or scan response).
A record includes a timestamp along with a header and a payload.
The data obtained from the data collection are stored as raw records
that are organized as follows:
• Metadata: timestamp;
• Advertising PDU header: PDU type, BD_ADDR type, length
of the advertising payload;
• Advertising payload: BD_ADDR, advertising data;
The advertising payload of each record is then parsed to ex-
tract AD structures and their various fields. To perform this task,
we implemented our own Python parser based on online official
Bluetooth SIG resources. The resulting data are then stored in a
relational database comprising 179 attributes corresponding to the
metadata, fields of the header and parsed AD structures.
3.3 Dataset preprocessing
Before performing our study, the dataset went through steps of
anonymization and sanitization to minimize the privacy risks asso-
ciated with the collected data and remove unwanted records.
Dataset anonymization. We focused on attributes corresponding
to identifiers (Stable device addresses, device names, etc.) and on
temporal data (timestamps). The following transformations were
applied:
• Device addresses: the Stable BD_ADDR (Public and Random
Static) have been pseudonymized through keyed-hashing2 of
the 24-bit lowest part (NIC), thus leaving the 24-bit highest
part (OUI) unmodified.
• Names of persons: fields potentially containing names were
sanitized by searching and removing substrings that were
matching the pattern of a name ("*.’s .*|*. ’s .*", "*.
de .*") or strings from a dictionary3 of names. Among the
1300 distinct device names of our dataset, we identified and
redacted 142 names related to physical persons from 4287
advertisement records accounting for 0.05% of the dataset.
• Timestamps: the temporal information has been transformed
from absolute (date and time) to relative (time elapsed since
the beginning of the collection campaign).
Nevertheless, in order to be able to conduct the analysis of the dis-
tribution of addresses (Section 5.2), we kept the list of raw Random
Static addresses that were stripped from any other information.
Dataset sanitization. BLE beacons are static devices deployed in
the physical space to enable localization services. Thus, they are of
little interest in the context of this study as they are not associated
to an individual. The records associated to beacons have been fil-
tered out the dataset based on regular expressions used to identify
2The key used during this process has been erased.
3We used the online french lastnames (https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3536630)
and firstnames (https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2540004) databases of INSEE.
Table 1: Distribution of BD_ADDR and records among the
device address types.
Stable Private
Public Static Non-res. Res.
#BD_ADDR 4.4k 1.1k 9.5k 38.5k
#Records 2.9M 220k 740k 4M
#adv. packets 2.2M 130k 700k 2.6M
#scan responses 700k 90k 40k 1.4M
the main beacons standards4. Using this approach, we identified
and removed a total of 50439 advertisement records accounting
for 0.63% of our original dataset. In addition to the sanitization of
beacons, we also removed all the records that have at least one mal-
formed5 AD structure leading to the suppression of 1958 additional
advertisement records representing 0.02% of our original dataset.
4 OBSERVATIONS ON THE DATASET
In this section, we present observations on the dataset used in
this study. This dataset, collected over 5 months, contains about 8
million records and includes more than 53500 distinct BD_ADDR.
Note that, since some of those addresses are random pseudonyms,
the number of actual devices is expected to be smaller than the
number of distinct device addresses.
4.1 Adoption of the LE Privacy feature
As described in Section 2.2, device addresses can be of 4 types: Pub-
lic, Random Static (Stable category), Random Non-resolvable and
Random Resolvable (Private category). Table 1 shows the distribu-
tion of BD_ADDR and records among the device address types in
our dataset.
In term of volume, we observed that Private addresses (Random
Resolvable and Random Non-resolvable) account for about 60% of
the advertisement packets found in our dataset. This shows that
the privacy-preserving mechanism of BLE is widely adopted by
the industry. This also highlights that a number of devices are
still using Stable addresses. In fact, our dataset includes more than
5500 Stable device addresses that can be trivially used to track the
corresponding users [7, 8, 11]. Moreover, we observed that 80%
of those Stable identifiers are of type Public, thus revealing the
globally unique MAC address assigned by the manufacturer to the
device.
Among the Private category, we computed that a large part of
advertisement packets belongs to the Random Resolvable type (4M
packets) representing more than 84% of the traffic generated by
Private addresses. This suggests that the resolvable feature of LE
Privacy is being endorsed by vendors over the non-resolvable option.
4Apple iBeacon (https://developer.apple.com/ibeacon/), Google Eddystone (https://
github.com/google/eddystone) and Radius Networks AltBeacon (https://github.com/
AltBeacon/spec).
5An AD structure that does not follow the format shown in Figure 1 and thus cannot
be correctly parsed.



















































Figure 2: Distribution ofOUI among Public device addresses.
4.2 Manufacturers OUI distribution
By definition, for device addresses falling in the Public type, it is
possible to identify the manufacturer via the OUI (Organizationally
Unique Identifier) of the address. The distribution of the top 10
OUI found within Public addresses is presented in Figure 2. We can
observe the prevalence of 4 companies producing electronic devices
(Samsung, Apple, Bose and Logitech) along with a chipset manufac-
turer (Texas Instruments). As they configure their products to use
Public addresses, those companies are exposing their customers to
tracking.
4.3 AD types distribution
Advertising data can contain a variety of AD types. In our dataset,
we found that advertising payloads contain 2 distinct AD structures
in average. The distribution of those AD types is highly concen-
trated as the six most common types (presented in Table 2) that
are included in more than 80% of the advertisement packets in
our dataset. Indeed, we computed that 6.3M advertisement records
include at least one of those six types.
Among those most common values, we can observe types used
to identify (Complete Local Name) or to describe the device and its
capabilities (Appearance and Flags). Other types are dedicated to
the advertisement of services (Complete List of 16-bit Service
Class UUIDs) and transmission of data (Manufacturer Specific
Data and Service Data-16-bit UUID).
Also, we can observe that the distribution of those AD types
varies according to the address type. For instance, the Complete
Local Name type, which is respectively found in 36.2% and 82.2%
of Public and Random Static addresses, is less observed with Pri-
vate addresses, which makes sense as those devices are supposed
to remain anonymous.
5 DEVICE ADDRESS RANDOMIZATION
SCHEME ANALYSIS
In this section, we leverage our dataset to analyze current imple-
mentations of the LE Privacy feature, and more particularly the
lifetime and the uniform distribution of the random addresses.
5.1 Lifetimes of device addresses
The Bluetooth Core Specification [24, Vol 6, Part B, sec. 6.1] rec-
ommends a maximum duration of 15 minutes for both Random
Table 2: Presence of AD types in advertising payloads. Nu-
merical values are fractions of addresses associated with
each type.
AD type Description Stable PrivatePublic Static Non-res. Res.
0x01 Flags 87.6 88.6 10.9 77.2
0xff Manufacturer
Specific Data
84.7 51 99.3 93
0x09 Complete Local
Name
36.2 82.2 0 1.7
0x03 Complete List of
16-bit Service
Class UUIDs
30.1 11.7 0.1 18.7




4.6 54.4 0 17.8
Others Other AD types 47.5 59.7 0.004 0.02
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Figure 3: Empirical cumulative distribution function for life-
times of device addresses.
Resolvable and Random Non-resolvable addresses to prevent track-
ing. On the opposite, Random Static (the third type of random
addresses) and Public addresses are not supposed to change and
are thus expected to be used for an extended duration. Due to our
method of data collection, the duration for which a device stays
in range during the collection cannot be controlled nor measured.
As a consequence, lifetimes measured here should be considered
as a conservative estimation. Indeed, a device may continue to use
its BD_ADDR after it goes out of our collecting device range. We
computed the lifetime of each device address and Figure 3 presents
the cumulative distribution of those lifetimes for the 4 types of
BD_ADDR.
First, we can observe that 41% of Public and 17% of Random
Static BD_ADDR have a lifetime of more than 3 hours. The very
short lifetime of the remaining Stable addresses is likely due to the
fact that the device was only observed during a single and short pe-
riod of time. On the other hand, we can observe that a vast majority
of Private addresses have a very short lifetime as 89% of Random
Resolvable and 96% of Random Non-resolvable addresses are ob-
served for a duration below 1 second. We can also observe that 6%
of Random Resolvable and 4% of Random Non-resolvable addresses
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Table 3: Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the ran-
dom part of random addresses against a uniform distribu-
tion.
BD_ADDR type Statistic p-value
Random Static 0.049615 3.851678x10−6
Random Non-resolvable 0.006928 0.153595
Random Resolvable 0.002908 0.636685
have a lifetime larger than 15 minutes. Some Private addresses have
even been observed for more than 69 days.
Those observations show that the recommendation of the life-
time of a device address is enforced by most implementations. How-
ever, some implementations of Private addresses are not following
the specifications, keeping the same address for an extended dura-
tion and thus exposing the users to tracking.
5.2 Uniformity of random addresses
distribution
According to the Bluetooth Core Specification [24, Vol 2, Part H,
sec. 2], random addresses should be generated using a FIPS compli-
ant PRNG and thus should exhibit some characteristics expected
from those PRNGs. In particular, it is expected that the output of
those PRNGs follows a uniform distribution. We used the random
addresses found within our dataset and tested whether this set of
random values followed a uniform distribution6.
For each random address found within our dataset, we extracted
the part that has been generated with a PRNG7 and submitted
those values to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistical test [5]. The
KS test is used to test whether one distribution of values differs
substantially from theoretical expectations. It outputs the distance
(the statistic) between the empirical distribution and the reference
distribution as well as a significance score (the p-value) that gives
the probability of obtaining this distance if the values were drawn
from the reference distribution [13]. The null hypothesis is rejected
when the p-value is below a certain threshold (values of 0.1, 0.05,
and 0.01 are typically used).
This test was run on each type of random addresses and produced
the results reported in Table 3. The p-values obtained for Random
Resolvable and Random Non-resolvable addresses are high (> 0.15)
while the p-value for Random Static is very small (< 10−5). This
means that the hypothesis that BD_ADDR are uniformly generated
can be rejected for the Random Static addresses and kept for both
Random Resolvable and Random Non-resolvable addresses. The
non-uniform distribution of Random Static addresses can be clearly
observed on Figure 4 that shows that some ranges of values are
more common than others. In fact, we have identified that some
categories of devices are using specific values for the higher part
of the device address (the leftmost 24 bits). For instance, Sony SRS
6Since those random values have been produced by different instances and implemen-
tations, it is thus not possible to test most of the properties required by FIPS.
7Not all the bits of random BD_ADDR are supposed to be random. First, the 2 most
significant bits are fixed to specify the type of the random address and are thus
not random. Then, for Random Non-resolvable and Random Static addresses, the 46
remaining bits are random. Actually, for the Random Resolvable addresses, only 22
bits are random because the 24 least significant bits are computed from the random
part prand and the IRK (see Section 2.2).

















Figure 4: Distribution of Random Static addresses using a
resolution of 1024 bins (size of a bin = 236).
5b:eb:b9:c5:f4:ee 6c:dc:32:08:38:04 5f:c6:5c:25:b7:5a
06ffe01242fda5 06ffe01242fda5 06ffe01242fda5
Figure 5: Representation of a successful attack. The BLE de-
vice is randomizing its BD_ADDR (in italic) over time while
keeping a static identifier (in bold) in the advertising data.
Such a 5-byte identifier can be used by a passive attacker to
link together the packets generated with the three different
BD_ADDR.
portable speakers and Samsung Gear smartwatches respectively use
c7:d5:0b (13 devices) and dc:c1:c6 (10 devices) as a prefix. This
suggests that some Random Static addresses are allocated by range,
the same way MAC addresses are allocated by OUI, potentially
revealing information on the type and the manufacturer of the
device (see Section 7).
Although the set of Random Non-resolvable and Random Re-
solvable addresses appear to be uniformly distributed, this does
not guarantee that all those addresses are generated with a FIPS
compliant PRNG, and that there are no other flaws in the generation
of those random addresses.
6 DEFEATING DEVICE ADDRESS
RANDOMIZATION
According to the results of the previous section, it appears that
globally, implementations of the address randomization scheme
avoid common pitfalls. However, we will show in the following
that data included in the rest of the advertising payload can con-
tain information that could negate the protection provided by the
address randomization.
6.1 Attacker model
In this section, we consider an external attacker which continuously
monitors the traffic on BLE advertising channels. This attacker
is thus able to capture the advertisement packets generated by
BLE devices in range. Furthermore, we assume that the attacker
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is passive: he only captures traffic and does not interact with the
wireless channel through injection or jamming.
On the victim side, we only make the assumption that his device
has its Bluetooth interface turned on and broadcasts advertisement
packets.
The goal of the attacker is to track a device beyond the address
randomization scheme based on the captured advertising traffic.
More specifically, a successful attack is defined as the attacker being
able to link two sets of advertisement packets generated by a single
device but with two distinct BD_ADDR. Consequently, a successful
attack links together two pseudonyms of a device.
Figure 5 shows an example where a device generates traffic with
three different BD_ADDR, but it is possible to link together the
three sets of advertisement packets based on a static identifier found
within the advertising data.
6.2 Static advertising identifiers
6.2.1 Device names. Complete Local Name and Shortened Local
Name are two AD types that are respectively used to advertise a
complete and a shortened version of local names assigned to de-
vices. From our dataset, we found that more than 1.7% of Random
Resolvable and 0.06% of Random Non-resolvable addresses include
either a Complete Local Name or a Shortened Local Name AD
structure in their advertising payloads.
Moreover, we discovered that a number of device names ad-
vertised over Private addresses include a part corresponding to
a unique identifier. For instance, device names of Xiaomi Amaz-
fit fitness trackers match the following pattern Amazfit-XXXX,
where XXXX are hexadecimal digits. We have identified several
other families of devices such as Boosted Boards skateboards and
Nokia/Withings smartwatches that also include an identifier in their
device names. In practice, the size of such an identifier varies from
1 to 4 bytes and could be used to track the device over time.
From our observations on the Public addresses, we found that
the identifier included in the device name is often the lowest part of
the device address. This suggests that, for devices using Private ad-
dresses, the digital identifiers found within the device names could
be a part of the device Public BD_ADDR.
6.2.2 Service UUIDs. Service UUIDs are identifiers that can be
found in several AD structures such as the Complete List of
16-bit Service Class UUIDs or the Service Data-16-bit
UUID structures. They can be advertised in a full (128 bits) or in a
shortened version (16 or 32 bits).
In this context, a UUID is tailored to identify a service rather
than a device. However, we found that some 128-bit UUIDs are
customized by manufacturers to include a complete Public address
in the least significant bits (LSB), thus forming a device unique
identifier. We found a total of 180 distinct UUIDs within advertise-
ment packets using Private addresses. Leveraging the registered
OUI of the included Public addresses along with the advertised
device names, we found that (1) some of those UUIDs belong to
the Nokia/Withings manufacturer and (2) they are broadcasted by
Steel smartwatches (9 devices). This practice introduces a secondary
unique identifier that can be used to track the device over time.
0x0c Length &
Version
1 byte 2 bytes
Apple Nearby
Identifier
up to 7 bytes
LSBMSB
Counter Apple HandoffData
2 bytes 11 bytes
Figure 6: Format of the Apple Handoff Manufacturer
Specific Data AD structure.
6.2.3 LE Bluetooth Device Address. The LE Bluetooth De-
vice Address [23, Part A, sec. 1.16] AD type can be used by a
Peripheral to broadcast a local device address and its class (Pub-
lic or random). Nevertheless, the Bluetooth Core Specification [23,
Part A, sec. 1] requires not to include such an AD structure in
the advertising data. Especially, this is important for devices that
use random BD_ADDR. However, we discovered that a number of
devices using random addresses are including this AD structure
in their advertising data and expose their Public device addresses.
Leveraging the OUI of those advertised addresses, we found out
that manufacturers such as LG Innotek and Arcadyan expose their
Public BD_ADDR this way.
6.3 Proximity protocols
In advertisement packets, AD structures such as the Manufacturer
Specific Data and the Service Data-16-bit UUID structures
can be used to carry application specific data. In the following, we
focus on two prevalent proximity protocols found within advertise-
ment packets and discuss on the fact that their broadcasted data
can expose information that can reduce or even negate the address
randomization mechanism.
6.3.1 Apple Handoff. The Apple Handoff8 protocol is part of the
Apple Continuity features and was introduced in Apple iOS 8 and
Apple OS X Yosemite operating systems. It allows users to switch
from one Apple device to another and continue an ongoing activ-
ity seamlessly. To enable this feature, Apple devices rely on Apple
Handoff data carried by the Manufacturer Specific Data AD
structure. The format of such an Apple Handoff structure is pre-
sented in Figure 6. It starts with an identifier indicating the type of
the advertising data, in this case Apple Handoff (0x0c), and includes
several fields such as a frame counter, the Apple Handoff data and
an Apple Nearby Identifier.
Counter. The counter is a 2-byte integer incremented over time,
but that can remain unchanged in several consecutive advertise-
ment packets. We found that this counter is not reset when the
BD_ADDR changes in the randomization scheme (see Figure 7).
This means that based on this counter, it is possible to link different
addresses belonging to the same device, as it has been shown with
802.11 probe requests frames [26].
Apple Nearby Identifier. According to the Apple iOS 12.3 secu-
rity guide [2], the Apple Nearby Identifier is used for the mutual
identification of devices linked to the same Apple iCloud account.
To prevent tracking based on this identifier, the Apple Nearby
protocol periodically generates a new identifier every time the
8https://support.apple.com/en-ca/HT204681#handoff
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Time (s) BD_ADDR
Apple Handoff Data
Cnt Data Nearby Id
(1)
899.256 59:07:ee:1e:6c:72 0003 1e47.. 10050b1c4f087d
899.820 59:07:ee:1e:6c:72 0103 a135.. 10050b1c4f087d
900.003 76:46:5d:85:9e:f2 0103 a135.. 10050b1c0b5c1f
900.252 76:46:5d:85:9e:f2 0203 0f48.. 10050b1c0b5c1f
(2)
1799.762 76:46:5d:85:9e:f2 - - 10050b1c0b5c1f
1799.990 76:46:5d:85:9e:f2 - - 10050b1c0b5c1f
1800.091 6d:01:ff:0a:52:84 - - 10050b1c0b5c1f
1800.203 6d:01:ff:0a:52:84 - - 10050b1c9d88fb
Figure 7: Sequence of Apple Handoff advertisement pack-
ets showing that (1) the counter is not reset after the
change of BD_ADDR at 900.003 and (2) the BD_ADDR and
Apple Nearby Identifier changes are not synchronized. At










2 bytes 4 bytes
Figure 8: Format of the Microsoft CDP Manufacturer
Specific Data AD structure.
BD_ADDR is changed. However, based on our observations on an
Apple iPhone 6 and an Apple iPhone 8 smartphone, the change of
the Apple Nearby Identifier is not completely synchronized with
the change of BD_ADDR: for a short duration after the BD_ADDR
change, the old Apple Nearby Identifier is used with the new device
address (see Figure 7). This means that based on the Apple Nearby
Identifier, it is possible to link two BD_ADDR used by the same
device.
In our dataset, we found that among the 31000 Private addresses
that include an Apple Manufacturer Specific DataAD structure,
more than 79% of them include an Apple Nearby Identifier field.
6.3.2 Microsoft Connected Devices Platform (CDP). The Microsoft
CDP [19] protocol provides a discovery system forMicrosoft devices
to authenticate and verify themselves as well as a way to exchange
data. Similarly to the Apple Handoff protocol, data ofMicrosoft CDP
are carried by the Manufacturer Specific Data AD structure.
Based on the Microsoft CDP [19] specifications along with empiri-
cal observations on advertisement packets, we have identified the
format of the Microsoft CDP structure (see Figure 8). In particular,
it includes an identifier that is derived from a salted hashing of the
unique device identifier [19, sec. 2.2.2.2.3].
Using a BLE-enabled laptop running Microsoft Windows 10 left
idled, we found that the lifetime of the BD_ADDR is around 16
minutes while the Device Hash lasts for approximately 60 minutes
(see Figure 9). First, we can observe that Random Non-resolvable ad-
dresses used to advertise Microsoft CDP data last longer than the
Bluetooth Core Specification recommended duration of 15 minutes.
Then, the switch to a new Device Hash is not synchronized with
the change of BD_ADDR. In fact, the Microsoft CDP advertising









Figure 9: Sequence of Microsoft CDP advertisement pack-
ets in which the lifetime of the Device Hash overlaps
the BD_ADDR randomization scheme. At 959.719, the
BD_ADDR changes while the Device Hash remains identical
until 3599.189.
exposure of an identifier whose lifetime overlaps the one of the
BD_ADDR.
From the dataset, we computed that more than 89% of Random
Non-resolvable addresses follow the format of the data shown in
Figure 8. Leveraging theDevice Type field foundwithin theMicrosoft
CDP data (see Figure 8), we found that 96% of such Random Non-
resolvable addresses are broadcasted from Microsoft Windows 10
computers (desktops and laptops). This suggests that a large fraction
of the BLE-enabled Microsoft devices are in fact trackable, despite
the use of address randomization. In addition, it appears that most
BLE-enabled Microsoft Windows 10 computers are affected by this
issue as we found that CDPUserSvc, the service responsible for the
broadcast of those Microsoft CDP messages, is enabled by default.
7 INFERRING INFORMATION FROM
ADVERTISING DATA
Advertising data include information that can cause privacy threats
beyond tracking. Indeed, we found that the characteristics of a
device such as its manufacturer, model or type can be inferred.
Those elements of information can become a privacy threat in the
context of inventory attacks and profiling [9], where an attacker
will try to infer information based on the device carried by the
user. For instance, a medical device can reveal a medical condition
and profiling individuals based on their devices is a direction taken
by some companies [28]. This section presents a review of the
information that can be inferred from advertising data. Our findings
are summarized in Table 4.
7.1 Device model and manufacturer
Public BD_ADDR. The Public device address is an identifier that
can be exposed in the AdvA field of the advertising payload or in
other AD structures (see Section 6). This identifier can be simply
leveraged to identify the device manufacturer because, as a MAC
address [24, Vol 2, Part B, sec. 1.2], its 24 most significant bits (MSB)
part corresponds to the OUI of the manufacturer.
Furthermore, since MAC addresses are typically allocated by
batch, a Public address could be used to identify the device model.
This approach has been demonstratedwithWi-FiMAC addresses [17]
and could be reproduced with BLE Public BD_ADDR. As shown
in Section 5.2, some Random Static addresses also appear to be
allocated by range. In those cases, the device model could be also
inferred from the Random Static address.
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Table 4: Summary of the information that can be inferred
















Public BD_ADDR ✓ ✓
Device names ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Manufacturer Specific Data ✓ ✓ ✓
Company IDs ✓ ✓
Manufacturer data ✓ ✓ ✓
Service UUIDs ✓ ✓ ✓
Appearance ✓
Class of Device ✓
Device names. As human friendly descriptors, the Complete
Local Name and Shortened Local Name AD structures often
include identifiers of manufacturers and models of devices. As a
result, those structures are two other sources of information that
can be used to deduce the manufacturer.
For instance, we identified that devices including patterns such as
LE-Bose and Jabra in their device names are respectively Bose and
Jabra manufactured headsets. In addition, we found that devices
such as Garmin fitness trackers and Bang&Olufsen headphones
include the name of their models in their device names.
Company IDs and service UUIDs. Advertising data can include
several identifiers tight to companies. For instance, this is the case of
the company IDs9 that are included in the Manufacturer Specific
Data AD structure. Like company IDs, members UUIDs10 are 16-bit
identifiers assigned by the Bluetooth SIG. Such members UUIDs
can be included in the Service Data-16-bit UUID and Complete
List of 16-bit Service Class UUIDs AD structures. The
presence of those indicators suggests that the device features a
service that has been designed by the corresponding company.
Indeed, for the sake of compatibility, it is possible that a service is
implemented by other companies than the one that has designed it.
However, we found that, in practice, those identifiers are generally
included by devices of the associated manufacturer.
In addition, some companies can design their own 16-bit UUIDs.
This information is not publicly available but can be obtained an-
alyzing the advertisement traffic generated by the devices. Sim-
ilarly, the 128-bit service UUIDs can be generated by manufac-
turers and can be leveraged as well. For instance, the adab09ad-
6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba custom 128-bit service UUID bro-
adcasted by Fitbit fitness trackers is associated with the Fitbit man-
ufacturer.
From our dataset, we computed that more than 78% of Stable and
95% of Private addresses are associated with at least one company
identifier (company ID or members UUID) in the advertising pay-





Public BD_ADDR:. As previously observed, the manufacturer of
a device can be derived from its Public BD_ADDR. Nevertheless,
when this manufacturer is focused on a single class of products,
it becomes possible to infer the type of the device from the Pub-
lic address. For instance, the OUI associated with Nintendo and
OculusVR respectively reveal a video game platform and a virtual
reality headset.
Service UUIDs. Service UUIDs are processed by Central to dis-
cover services offered by nearby Peripheral before establishing a
connection. Some service UUIDs assigned by the Bluetooth SIG
reveal particular characteristics of a device that can lead to the in-
ference of its type. For instance, looking at the online Bluetooth SIG
database11 of 16-bit service UUIDs, we can infer that devices which
broadcast the Running Speed and Cadence service UUID (0x1814)
are likely fitness trackers while those that advertise the Insulin
Delivery service UUID (0x183a) are healthcare devices.
In addition, as mentioned in Section 7.1, a custom 128-bit ser-
vice UUID can disclose attributes of a device such as its manufac-
turer or its model that could lead to an implicit identification of its
type. For instance, the aa745be2-9025-4bf2a318-91f3dba2999f
128-bit service UUID is associated with Garmin Nuvi GPS while
0000de00-3dd4-4255-8d62-6dc7b9bd5561 is advertised byNikon
cameras. Nevertheless, even though those service UUIDs are cus-
tomized by the manufacturers, we discovered that some of them
are hardcoded in open-source specifications and codes. This is es-
pecially the case with the Google hearing aid12 specifications and
the Sony SmartBand SWR-1013 open API. Therefore, such online
resources can be also leveraged to identify the type of a device.
Manufacturer Specific Data. The data carried by the Manufa-
cturer Specific Data AD structure can include fields indicating
the type of the device. Indeed, this is the case of Garmin (company
ID 0x0087), for which the 16 MSB of data disclose the model of the
device: 0x0657 and 0x0802 respectively indicate Garmin Forerun-
ner 620 and Garmin Fenix 3 fitness smartwatches. Similarly, for
Apple (company ID 0x004c), the 8 MSB of data expose the type
of the device: 0x07 and 0x0b respectively disclose Apple AirPods
earphones and Apple Watch smartwatches. We also discovered
that other experimental results14 support and confirm some of our
observations.
Moreover, we found that the Microsoft CDP proximity protocol
includes a Device Type field (see Figure 8) that provides information
on the nature of the device. As a consequence, when the value of
this field is filled accordingly to theMicrosoft CDP specifications [19,
sec. 2.2.2.2.3], we can infer the type of the advertising device by
lookup in the specifications: Xbox One (0x01), Windows 10 Desktop
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Appearance and Class of Device. The Bluetooth Core Spec-
ification defines two AD types, Appearance15 and Class of De-
vice16, that are designed to carry information about the nature of
a device and more specifically its external appearance. For instance,
the Appearance code 0x00c1 disclose a sport watch, while the
Class of Device code 0x022808 indicates a toy vehicle. More wor-
risome, certain codes indicate specific medical devices: Appearance
codes such as 0x0d00 and 0x0d48 respectively betray a glucose
monitor and an insulin pen, while Class of Device codes such as
0x02292c and 0x022930 respectively denote a medication monitor
system and a knee prosthesis.
In our dataset, we found that more than 5.3% of Public and 13.3%
of Random Static addresses include either an Appearance or a
Class of Device AD structure in their advertising data. Also, for
Private addresses, only 0.01% of Random Resolvable BD_ADDR bro-
adcast data carried by the Appearance AD structure while the
Class of Device type is not advertised. Among the most common
appearances and class of devices, we found that devices such as
Tile iTag keyrings, Giant RideSense cycling sensors and Diggro
ID10x heart rate belts explicitly advertise their external appearances
allowing a passive observer to infer the type of the device based on
those information.
7.3 Identity of the owner
The Complete Local Name and Shortened Local Name AD struc-
tures carry a textual description of the device that can be often
customized by users. As a result, a number of those device names
include the identity of the owner under the form of a full name, a
firstname, a lastname or a nickname. For instance, we found that
Bose headsets and Apple smartphones broadcast such device names
that include the name of the owner: LE-Bose Alice and Bob’s
iPhone. During our dataset anonymization process (see Section 3.3),
we identified and subsequently anonymized a total of 10.9% of the
1300 distinct device names advertised from 0.4% of the addresses of
the dataset.
8 RELATEDWORK
Exposure of personal information through wireless networks have
been the subject of numerous works. For instance, it has been
highlighted that 802.11 local service discovery exposes identifying
information [21], relationships [21] and social links [6]. Most im-
portantly, link layer identifiers such as MAC addresses can be used
to track users in the physical world [4, 10].
Several works have focused on the privacy aspects of BLE. Das
et al. demonstrated [7] how the BLE traffic generated by a fitness
wristband can be leveraged to infer the activity of its owner.
In BLEB [11], the authors introduced a BLE botnet of smart-
phones for wide scale tracking and highlighted that BLE privacy
features are not used by some wearable devices. Fawaz et al. in-
troduced BLE-Guardian [8], a solution to protect BLE users from
privacy threats. In addition, they discussed several privacy issues
of BLE advertisement, some of which are analyzed in detail in our




random addresses, and that some of the temporary identifiers are
used for long periods of time. We consolidate those observations
by providing an updated and detailed review of those issues and
identifying new privacy concerns such as those introduced by the
proximity protocols.
Recently, Becker et al. demonstrated [3] that the LE Privacy fea-
ture can be defeated leveraging the advertising payload. We com-
plement this work by deeply investigating the device address ran-
domization scheme not limiting us to empirical observations. More-
over, based on our large-scale measurement, we are able to provide
insights on the current adoption and implementations of the LE
Privacy feature in the wild. Finally, we go beyond tracking concerns
showing how advertising data can leak private information.
Martin et al. showed [17] that the MAC address of 802.11 devices
can reveal the type of the device in addition of its manufacturer.
Our study shows that the BLE advertising payload can be used to
this aim.
In their blog posts [14, 15], Lester and Stone pointed out that
some elements contained in BLE advertisement packets can be
leveraged to identify the nature of the device. We complement
those observations presenting a comprehensive analysis of the AD
structures that can expose the model and the type of a device.
Several tools for parsing the content of BLE advertising data
have been produced by the community. In particular, the advlib [12]
JavaScript library and the RaMBLE [14] Android mobile applica-
tion are capable of decomposing and interpreting a number of AD
structures. Our Python parser consolidates the features of those
contributions and add several elements such as the decomposition
of 128-bit UUIDs, manufacturer specific data and service data, to
name a few.
To reduce the risk of user tracking, several approaches have
been proposed such as the use of temporary identifiers [10] and
protocols based on cryptographic primitives [21, 27].
Use of disposable link layer identifiers [10] have been progres-
sively adopted by the industry [26]. However, several works [16, 26]
have shown the limitation of MAC address randomization in the
context of 802.11. Vanhoef et al. [26] and Martin et al. [16] showed
that MAC randomization can be defeated thanks to the data con-
tained in the body of the frame. Several of the issues affecting BLE
and discussed in our paper, such as non-reset counters and static
identifiers, were also found in 802.11 by those works [16, 26]. Fi-
nally, timing of frames has been also considered as a way to defeat
802.11 address randomization [18].
9 CONCLUSION
This study presented a detailed analysis of the privacy provisions
and issues in current implementations of the BLE advertising mech-
anism. First, we found that even if address randomization is widely
adopted by vendors, a number of devices still use Stable addresses,
exposing their owners to tracking. Furthermore, we found that
this randomization scheme is not always correctly implemented
as some devices exceed the recommended maximum duration of
the random addresses. We also identified that, despite the use of
a random device address, the content of the advertisement pack-
ets can be used to track users. Indeed, the address randomization
scheme can be rendered useless by counters and static identifiers
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included by some devices in their advertising data. In particular, we
found that custom data included in proximity protocols of Apple
andMicrosoft can be leveraged to defeat the randomization scheme.
Finally, we showed how the advertising data can be mined to infer
the nature of a BLE device, exposing the owner to further privacy
threats such as inventory attacks and profiling.
We informed the manufacturers of the privacy issues identified
in this paper17.
A part of the issues presented in this paper are the results of
manufacturers that do not follow the BLE specifications. For in-
stance, the inclusion of the LE Bluetooth Device Address AD
structure in advertising data is clearly against the specifications.
Nevertheless, most of the issues are the results of practices that are
not forbidden by the specifications. For instance, using a custom
UUID that includes a device address is compliant with the speci-
fications. Similarly, there are no instructions on the nature of the
information that can be carried by the Manufacturer Specific
Data and Service Data AD structures. In fact, the BLE specifi-
cations do not provide any guidelines about the content of the
advertising payload with regard to the privacy implications.
Currently, the privacy considerations of the BLE specifications
are limited to the management of random link layer identifiers.
However, as we showed in this paper, other elements of the advertis-
ing mechanism can be used to breach privacy. Thus, it is important
to complement the specifications with additional requirements that
would cover privacy issues such as those discussed in this paper.
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